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Abstract 
The rise of Al Shabaab was achieved primarily in three ways. The first way was  
through the power granted to them as the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union.  
Governmental legitimacy allowed them to enforce sharia law throughout Somalia, and  
this was reinforced even further as they were able to fend off Ethiopia's invasion.  
Secondly, they were able to surpass tribal affiliations and use Islam as the rallying tool to  
organize, and gain support in the faced of a growing secular government. Lastly, Al  
Shabaab created alliances that provided them with logistical and financial support, to  
include Eritrea, Al Qaeda, foreign sympathizers, and displaced Somalis who fled  
previously, but were returning to support the organization. However, the aforementioned  
collective action caused problems. As power was gained, it was abused, and innocent  
civilians became casualties of their struggle to maintain legitimacy. Also, as allies  
increased from outside of Somalia, a movement that was once based on nationalism  
became elevated to one with international implications, causing internal strife between its  
members. Also, increased violence has made them more of a target for stronger forces  
that seek to destroy any forms of fundamental terrorism. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
Since the beginning of the Global War of Terrorism, there have been many  
efforts by the Western world in their desire to respond to any entities that  
threaten their ideas of democracy and freedom. However, new fundamentalist groups and  
sympathizers continue to grow exponentially, creating a vast global network of  
organizations who seek to halt the imposition of all that is Western. Some of them are  
widely known and well established, and world political powers have focused most of  
their attention on them, yet while this is occurring, others are utilizing this lack of  
attention to prosper. One of these groups is the Somalia based Al Shabaab.  
 The story of Al Shabaab is a complex one. Born out of a long history of religious  
fervor, colonial resistance, and the necessity to establish some form of order in a lawless  
nation, the once militant arm of an Islamic based governance system has emerged as  
fast growing terrorist organization with international reach. Recently, world powers are  
starting to realize the increased threat of Al Shabaab, and Western media sources have  
turned their cameras towards the East African nation and this group. Despite increased  
attention, there has been no major deployment of US troops or their allies. Somalia, like  
other African countries, does not appear to be a major concern for the West, and much  
of this can be tied to racist and Eurocentric ideologies that plague the world in relation  
to the diverse landmass which at one point was referred to as the “Dark Continent.” This  
mindset has served as the catalyst for Al Shabaab to exist, and even grasp political  
power within Somalia.  
Recently, Al Shabaab has garnered much attention for two main reasons. The  
first reason is their declaration of  allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012 (Hansen 2013). Al  
Qaeda has been severely weakened in the last ten years, especially after the death of the  
elusive Usama bin Ladin. However, alliances such as the one with Al Shabaab proves  
that the ideology remains strong and has an audience, and adds to the ever growing fear  
of transnational terrorism. Al Qaeda’s backing could potentially lead to Al Shabaab  
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securing weapons and financial support, and the country of Somalia could quickly  
become a staging area for international attacks or a possible hiding location for  
leadership, though as of yet, there has been no substantial proof of this. 
Secondly, Al Shabaab has begun to spread outside of Somalia, creating problems  
for US backed nations such as Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as the Western world.  
Recently Al Shabaab claimed responsibility occurred in Kenya’s capitol, Nairobi, when  
militants killed 62 people at the Westgate Mall (Karimi 2013). Because of this and its  
past history with Somalia, the Ethiopian government has warned its citizens of possible  
attacks at the hands of Al Shabaab. Furthermore, there have been numerous American  
and European citizens who have left their homelands, and have become active members  
within the organization. This has been common within the ranks of Al Qaeda, but for  
such a small, grassroots group like Al Shabaab to recruit internationally proves that they  
could pose a major threat, as well as be the next major breeding ground for a worldwide  
terrorist threat.  
 Though Al Shabaab is starting to gain some recognition, the historical conditions  
that led to its rise seem to be greatly ignored.  Colonialism, poverty, lack of 
infrastructure, and invasions by foreign military forces have all contributed to their rise.  
One unique factor in relation to their rise is that they were not founded in response to  
vast globalization and forceful cultural assimilation, but out of the desire of  
self-governance based on Islam. After the failed attempt by US led forces to remove  
Aidid from power in 1993, Somali citizens were left to fend for themselves due to  
government corruption and dire living conditions (Stevenson 1993). With minimal  
support from the outside entities and no established economy or proper government,  
locals looked to Islam and sharia law for guidance to protect them from greedy warlords  
who pillaged their way into power. Al Shabaab grew out of this need for protection, yet  
became illegitimate when they adapted the harsh tactics of the warlords they opposed.  
Even so, some of their legitimacy returned when they ousted US backed Ethiopian  
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forces in 2009 after a three year war. However, their patriotic deeds and origins  
drastically conflict with the nature of Al Shabaab in its current state. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to present a historical analysis about the rise and  
possible failure of Al Shabaab based on theories of power and collective action.  In order  
to do so, Somalia must be studied from the eras of colonialism and introduction of Islam,  
and modernization. I propose that the struggle for Somalia to find its place within the  
world system and the concurrent lack of infrastructure has served as the catalyst for Al  
Shabaab to flourish. On the other hand, I propose that new alliances, international  
recruiting, and media exposure will lead to the demise of the organization for two  
reasons. The first reason is that increased exposure will heighten world awareness to only  
the attacks and other negative actions by Al Shabaab, completely overshadowing any  
legitimacy it possesses. Additionally, the fear of Al Shabaab expanding will lead Western  
nations to target and suppress them to avoid another massive conflict.  Second, Al  
Shabaab has undergone a forced change of mission. Al Shabaab is no longer a grassroots,  
pure Somali organization. This has already, and will continue to lead to friction between  
those who prefer to have a local focus and others who see the necessity to expand beyond  
the borders of Somalia. As seen with many other factions or social movements,  
dissidence within the ranks could ultimately cause it to implode and cease to be a factor  
in Somalia or the world as a whole. Regardless of the outcome, Al Shabaab has become a  
threat to global security, and must not be taken lightly.  
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Chapter II Terrorism, Legitimacy and Theorizing Power 
Terrorism 
There is currently no universally accepted definition of terrorism. However there have  
been very many attempts, especially by the Western powers who see dissident groups  
rooted in the peripheral world as a threat to world order. There is currently no universally  
accepted definition of terrorism. However there have been very many attempts to create  
one, especially by the Western powers who see dissident groups rooted in the peripheral  
world as a threat to world order.  In “Terrorism as a Method of Terrorism”, Thomas  
Kapitan lays out the three main definitions used by the organizations at the forefront of  
suppressing terrorism: the US State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and  
the US Department of Defense (DOD). The common theme between the three is the use  
of politically motivated violence; however they vary in other terms. The State  
Department definition specifically mentions acts against noncombatants only, with no  
reference to armed forces or law enforcement. The FBI and Department of Defense  
definitions include unlawful force against governments and civilians/societies, to  
achieve political and social objectives, but the difference between the two is that the  
DOD mentions religious objectives as objectives as well (Kapitan 2004). If the US  
government, who is at the forefront of the global War on Terrorism, cannot decide on a  
concrete definition of terrorism, how can those of us who study the phenomenon  
come to a consensus that will help us guide our research?  
Before I continued with my research, I felt it was essential to establish a definition  
of terrorism, especially in relation to Al Shabaab, and why I consider the group to be  
labeled as such an organization. This definition of terrorism is based off of years of  
studying the topic as a student, as well as my experience with terrorism while deployed to  
the Middle East, and is as follows: the lawful or unlawful act of a particular entity  
using violent or potentially violent force to scare, coerce, or physically harm those that  
oppose their ideology, or stand in the way of power gains, whether those be financial,  
5 
 
territorial, ideological, etc. My definition encompasses actions taken by a state and  
insurgent based organizations that may or not be formally recognized by a governing  
body. In relation to Al Shabaab, it is important to have a multifaceted definition because  
the group was once a legitimate part of the transitional Somali government, yet broke free  
and became its own entity, free of rule from a rather corrupt and unstable administration  
that had failed to make any progress in the war torn nation.  
As sociologists, we often find ourselves leaning on classical and contemporary   
sociological theory to guide our research, as well as paying homage to those who came  
before us; however, this is somewhat difficult because many of the theories are dated,  
and phenomena such as terrorism were not  prevalent topics of discussion during the  
times in which many of these theories were written. Though other soial sciences such as  
political science and psychology have focused on terrorism, the sociological analysis of   
terrorism only became a hot issue after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center  
(Deflem 2004). However, this does not mean that there aren’t theories, or a combination  
of theories that could aptly describe the expansion of terrorist groups . Three elements  
that I feel must be analyzed in order to fully understand Al Shabaab are legitimacy,  
power and collective action.  
Legitimacy 
Throughout this writing, the concept of legitimacy will be used frequently;  
however, from a terrorism perspective, is there even such a thing as legitimate terrorist  
organization? Initially I will offer two different definitions from political scientist Peter  
Stillman and sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset. The first definition is as follows: the  
compatibility of the results of the governmental output with the value pattern of the  
relevant systems, that is, those affected by these results (Stillman, 1974). To me, this  
means that the government must implement standards and abide by them as well, in a  
way that is aligned with the needs and values of their citizens. Stillman later goes on to  
state that revolutions against and obedience to a government are frequently justified if not  
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partially caused by men’s ideas about what constitutes legitimate government  
(Stillman 1974). S.M. Lipset also provided a very clear description of legitimacy in his  
book Political Man, which states “Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to  
engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most  
appropriate ones for the society” (Lipset 1960). These definitions are very important in  
the case of Somalia, because through their history, and the history of Al Shabaab, civil  
conflicts have occurred based on one or more parties’ viewpoint on the legitimacy of the  
government, and on the flip side, the belief of Al Shabaab and their followers that their  
form of Islam, as well as their tactics to spread their viewpoint, was legitimate.  
Now that legitimacy has been defined, it is necessary to determine what elements  
have led to the increased or loss of legitimacy of the Somali government and/or Al  
Shabaab throughout history. One factor is corruption. Somalia has been plagued with  
corruption by leaders who abused their power for personal gain. Along with that has been  
the battle between Somali culture, Islam, and Westernization, which has caused much  
strife among various groups and transitional governments. With Al Shabaab, these  
struggles plague them as well, which could ultimately lead to their demise. This will be  
discussed in detail in later chapters.  
Power 
In my own terms, power is defined as the ability to control, or to have  
overwhelming strength when compared to another. As with terrorism, the definition of  
power is far from universal. From a Western hegemonic perspective, it seems impossible  
that any organization or state outside of the Global North would ever have any real  
power, but in various instances, this has proven to be false. Groups like Al Shabaab may  
not ever achieve levels of power at the levels of nations like the United States, but small  
victories have led to increased motivation, which could create a chain reaction of various  
types of success on various fields of achievement. 
In John Gaventa’s “Finding the Spaces for Change: A Power Analysis,” he  
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discusses four types of power: power over, power to, power within, and power with.  
“Power ‘over’ refers to the ability of the powerful to affect the actions and thought of  
the powerless. The power ‘to’ is important for the capacity to act; to exercise agency  
and to realize the potential of rights, citizenship or voice. Power ‘within’ often refers to  
gaining the sense of self-identity, confidence and awareness that is a precondition for  
action. Power ‘with’ refers to the synergy which can emerge through partnerships and  
collaboration with others, or through processes of collective action and alliance  
building (Gaventa 2006).  
The aforementioned forms of power are important because they reduce the  
ambiguity and relativity of the term, therefore making it more universal and applicable  
to various stages within the lifespan of an organization, but also allows power to be  
seen in entities that are traditionally deemed powerless, especially when compared to  
large and established nation states, armed forces, etc. It is important to note that  
Gaventa is mainly focusing on the power of a state, but from a terrorism perspective,  
these same elements are very prevalent in non-state organizations, and can be seen  
especially in the rise of Al Shabaab. Gaventa further breaks down his analysis of power  
into forms, spaces, and levels, and this is illustrated in the “power cube.” 
 
Figure 1: The ‘power cube': the levels, spaces and forms of power 
 
 
 
 
 
Visible 
Hidden 
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In relation to Al Shabaab, I have focused mainly on levels as opposed to spaces  
and forms. Here is my initial analysis in relation to the increase of power and spread of  
ideology of the organization: 
Local 
Al Shabaab was started in the African nation in Somalia, and initially derived  
power based on localized Islamic culture and tribal affiliations. Also, the group sought to  
maintain power in smaller areas, yet began to expand in order to establish a greater  
influence over the nation. 
National 
Al Shabaab became the militant arm of a post-civil war transitional government  
and derived its power based on nationalism, isolationism, and a desire to prevent outside  
influences, especially from the West and its allies. Though not a formal military group,  
they acted as such, and were supported by Somali citizens and even other African  
nations.   
International 
 Somalia as a whole attracted international attention due to the various human  
rights violations exposed during the 1993 civil war. After the transitional government  
sought to reestablish power in later years, outside entities such as Ethiopia sought to  
invade the nation, yet others, such as Eritrea, became allies of the government in order  
to stop the spread of Ethiopia’s power. As Al Shabaab became more militant and gained  
power, they were continually supported by Eritrea, as well as other dissident  
organizations, especially Al Qaeda.  
 The aforementioned levels appear to have happened in some type of natural,  
chronological order which may have led to expansion of Al Shabaab’s power and  
success. However, these often happened simultaneously and were not always harmonic,  
leading to a power struggle which will be discussed later. 
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Collective Action 
Along with power, it is essential to discuss collective action, which occurs when  
individuals join together to reach a common goal, whether it be to rid themselves of a  
grievance or increase their power. Collective action manifests when individuals seek  
some form of private reward, rather it be a job, money or power, which are often drawn  
from the store of resources from existing organizations (Hetcher et al 1982). Though this  
may be true for some, all the rewards are not necessarily private, but is for the greater  
good, and can include rewards such as freedom from an oppressive government or from  
an outside influence. Though the forming and actions of terrorist organizations are not  
commonly analyzed from a social movement perspective, it is important to realize that  
their motivations are very similar to those of more popular American social movements  
such as the Civil Rights and the Women’s Rights Movement. For example, many terrorist  
organizations are formed in For example, many terrorist organizations are formed in  
reaction to the overbearing Western hegemony. Also they seek to be recognized as  
legitimate, but as opposed to the desire to be seen as equal to an opposing side, they  
want to rid themselves of Western influence, seek self-governance, and they make it  
clear that they will continue to conduct violent acts in response to any opposition,  
whether it be physical or ideological. However, the same initial collective action that  
provided the catalyst for action could be the same that weakens a particular group.  
Whenever an organization grows in size and power, there will always be a struggle to  
maintain ideology, goals, and hierarchy, and with every cycle of evolution, there will be  
some dissidence that could lead to chaos and breakdown of unity. On the other hand, due  
to a governmental effort to punish those participants, failure of collective action may be  
high, which could dissuade others from joining   (Hetcher et al 1982). With Al Shabaab,  
both of these situations have already occurred, and this may ultimately lead to weakness  
and/or destruction. 
 
10 
 
Power and Collective Action 
My theory is centered on the interaction of power relations and collective action.  
Initially I focused on Richard Emerson’s power dependency which is as followed: 
Pab=Dba: the power of a over b is equal to the dependency of b on a. 
This power is a property of a relation and that power is a potential. Power of course 
is affected by social structure and characteristics of actors (Ritzer 2003 p 421). 
This theory was an initial starting point, but in my research, I have found that the  
factor of dependency is not always suitable to explain the rise of Al Shabaab. Based on  
this, the theory was altered to reflect collective action. Before presenting the theories, I  
have provided definitions for all the variables to be discussed and are as follows: 
P:Power- The ability to control; to have overwhelming strength when compared to 
another.  
a. Al Shabaab and allies 
b. Those who oppose Al Shabaab, to include, Western forces/governments and their  
allies, as well as elements of transitional and current Somali government 
aca: Collective action of Al Shabaab.  
a-ca: Reduction or lack of collective action of Al Shabaab 
bca: Collective action of those who oppose Al Shabaab 
Based on these variables I have constructed three formulas that will set the tone for my  
analysis of Al Shabaab: 
Pa is dependent on aca.: The power of Al Shabaab  is dependent on the collective action 
of Al Shabaab and its allies.  
Pa decreases as a-ca occurs:  The power of Al Shabaab decreases as their collective 
action is reduced. 
Pb is dependent on bca: The power of those who oppose Al Shabaab is dependent on the 
collective action  
All three levels of power, as well as how they correlate to collective action will  
be analyzed from a historical perspective. It is important to realize that any of the above  
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situations could occur at any time in the life cycle of Al Shabaab. Also, power as  
discussed in this research is not always based on physical strength, but is strongly based  
on ideology and self-perception. Truthfully speaking, it is highly unlikely that Al  
Shabaab will ever amass the amount of power of countries such as the United States, yet  
small victories and increasing influences will allow Al Shabaab a longevity that could be  
problematic for the world. 
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Chapter III History 
Islam 
Studies of terrorism often neglect the history of their countries of origins, and  
how it has led to the creation of such groups. In relation to Al Shabaab, this is very  
important in order to understand how they gained some form of legitimacy. The most  
important part of this history is tied to the rise of Islam in the African nation. Somalia is  
currently approximately 99 percent Muslim, with the majority of its practitioners being  
Sunni. With deep roots in the mystical Sufi sect, Islam in Somalia focuses on principles  
such as constant application of divine worship, complete devotion to God, abstinence  
from pleasure, and aversion from false splendor of the world  (Peters 1994). Though there  
is no definitive date to denote when Islam made its way to Somalia, the religion has been  
around for approximately 1400 years, and scholars have speculated  how this introduction  
occurred. One explanation is that the followers of the Prophet Muhammad brought the  
religion when they fled Mecca to avoid persecution. Another is that Islam was brought to  
the nation when Arab and Persian traders set up posts along the Somali coast  
(Ousman 2004). This second explanation is extremely important because it sets into play  
a relationship that would continually introduce Somalis to different types of more militant  
Islam which ultimately played a role in the rise of Al Shabaab, and this will be discussed  
in more detail later .  
The spread of Islam in Somalia helped to establish city- states along the  
coast such as the capital city of Mogadishu and Zeila, yet also spread into nomadic  
communities outside of urbanized areas, which were controlled by clan leaders  
(Ahmed 2007). Some scholars believe that Islam added depth and coherence to  
elements of traditional culture and united Somalis who were previously defined by their  
many sectional divisions and provided the basis for their national consciousness. From  
another perspective, it is believed that Islam did not create a unity that transcended  
tribal loyalties. Instead, that unity was found in the form of ethnic solidarity and  
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a common language, yet garnered no political authority (Sanderson 1985). From the lens  
of Al Shabaab, I believe the first perspective is the most applicable to understand how the 
organization came into fruition. Introduction of Islam into the social structure of Somalia  
created somewhat of a bond with other Muslim nations, and as anti-Western sentiment  
increased in the Middle East, it would seem only natural that the perceived “attack on  
Islam” would be felt in Somalia, creating sympathizers who supported the actions of  
Islamic fundamentalist groups particularly those who are of the Sunni sect. As of now,  
there has not been any proof that Al Shabaab is anti-Shiite as other groups are, but based  
on their actions, they do seem to be anti-Christian. Islam also created a solidarity that  
prevented other religions from achieving dominance. Also, this Islamic based nationalism  
has served as the glue that has held Al Shabaab together. However, the second  
perspective is important to consider because the refusal of the modern Somali  
government to fully incorporate Islam into decision making, and choosing Western  
ideologies instead created frustration and the desire for an Islamic state, by any means  
necessary. 
Colonization 
Due to its coastal location, Somalia has long been in contact with foreign traders, such  
as Arabs, Indians, and the Portuguese, yet attempts to invade or colonize were infrequent  
or unsuccessful. Cities like Mogadishu were centers for trade and education, which both  
flourished under a series of Islamic sultanates. However, during the Scramble for Africa  
after the 1884 Berlin Conference, the European nations of Great Britain, and  
Italy claimed part of Somalia, with the former taking power in the North and in latter the  
south (Ware 1965). As the powerful countries laid their claim, there were those who were  
willing to stand up for their right to autonomy. One of these was Mohammed Abdullah  
Hassan, also known as the Mad Mullah, who led one of the greatest and long lasting  
resistance movements against Europeans.  
Hassan was born in 1856 in the part of Somalia that would eventually be  
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controlled by the British. After undertaking the Hajj in the 1890s, he returned to his  
homeland and began to preach ideologies heavily influenced by the Sufi sect of Islam,  
but found little success. He moved from the Berbera area into the hinterland  
where he found more followers, and declared jihad on British authorities and Ethiopian  
rulers, as well as on those Somalis who were not deemed pious in his eyes (Slight 2010).  
Hassan and his continually growing number of followers defeated the colonizers on four  
separate occasions between 1901 and 1904 by using guerilla tactics that were a drastic  
shift from those of the highly regimented and conventional British forces. 
The 1905 Treaty of Ilig, signed by both British and Italian officials, provided  
Hassan and supporters with an autonomous piece of land located in Italian Somaliland  
along the Indian Ocean Coast (Kapteijns, 1995). This peace lasted until 1909 when  
British forces began to occupy the Somali Coast. The jihad resumed, but was not as  
successful due to the fact that Hassan changed tactics from mobile to fixed defensive  
postures, which proved no match for the British. The jihadists continued to fight, but  
were ultimately defeated in 1920 by the British Royal Air Force and the Camel Corps,  
causing the death of many of Hassan’s followers. Hassan fled to Ethiopia where he  
succumbed to influenza that year, and the remaining jihadists returned to their native  
lands, signaling an end to one of the once successful fights against colonialism in African  
history. 
Steps Towards Independence and Autonomy 
British maintained control of the British Somaliland until 1886 until 1940, when  
Italian troops declared war on Britain, subsequently invading the north. However in  
1941, British forces captured all of Somalia. In 1949, the United Nations General  
Assembly gave Italy control of Italian Somaliland as an international trusteeship, only for  
it to become independent in April 1960. Britain followed suit five days later and British  
Somaliland joined with its newly free counterpart to define the modern nation of  
Somalia. 
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After Somalia achieved independence in 1960, prominent nationalist Aden  
Abdullah Osman Daar was elected as the nation’s first president, and held the office  
until 1967, when he was defeated by Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, the man Daar appointed  
as Prime Minister in 1964. Shermarke was known for his foreign policy innovations, such  
as accepting money from the Soviet Union, as well as allowing them to build an air base  
in the nation. Other Western powers, such as the United States, West Germany, and Italy  
Italy provided financial support which created small alliances between Somalia and these  
other nations (Ware 1960). As far as domestic policy, he promoted nationalism and  
representation from Somalia’s diverse ethnic clans. For example, he allowed Shermarke’s  
Prime Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, to increase the number of cabinet ministers to  
include every major clan family (Adam, 1994). Though this may have been favored by  
many Somali nationalists, corruption and injustices led to Shermrake’s assassination in  
1969, followed by a military coup led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who  
became president that same year, remaining in power until he was overthrown in 1991.  
The fact that the coup was successful is important to examine as we reference our initial  
definitions of legitimacy, especially that of Lipset, because it shows that the public saw  
Barre as a leader who would eradicate the political, societal, and economical ills that the  
country suffered. (Ingiriis 2012). It was popularly believed that Barre’s military, which  
was highly respected amongst Somali citizens, would bring the order and stability  
needed, yet this was not the case. Due to internal division and excessive human rights  
violations conducted by the military, citizens realized that these ills that they thought  
would dissipate remained, and in some ways became worse (Ingiriis 2012). 
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The Barre Years: Setting The Stage For Terror 
President Mohammed Siad Barre fell victim to the same fate as many leaders of  
the African continent, and the culmination of greed and flawed foreign policy led to his  
overthrow. Barre attempted to play both sides of the Cold War and received financial  
and arms support from both the United States and the former Soviet Union; however  
aid from the United States was more abundant, therefore Somalia became one of their  
allies. (Johns 1989). American forces were allowed access to Somali military bases which  
served as a balance to Soviet military involvement in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian  
Peninsula (Johns 1989). From a social and educational perspective, Barre made room for  
Western trained intellectuals and implemented the use of Latin alphabet to write Somali.  
Also, he provided funding for students to go to Sudan and Saudi Arabia where Islamic  
trends of nationalism and support of sharia law  were developing . Also during this time,  
the 1979 Iranian Revolution occurred, so a mixture of Islamic education and the  
witnessing of a revolution in a Muslim country that was heavily supported by students  
provided a new ideology that would be taken back to Somalia (Marchal 2011). 
Though it seemed as if Barre was setting the stage for a new Somalia, his regime  
was also defined by human rights violations conducted against civilians by the Somali  
Armed Forces, leading the US government to begin to withdraw aid from Somalia in the  
1980s Also, armed clan based movements that sought control of various parts of Somalia  
weakened the Somali government, eventually leading to his overthrow in 1991. The  
leader of this ouster was warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid; the conflict ensued, leading to  
a civil war as various factions struggled to establish dominance over the war torn country.  
Operation Restore Hope 
 The civil wars in Somalia left the nation with no established government, and  
due to the bloodshed, many were left homeless, or subject to the cruelty of war.  
100,000 weapons left over from the Cold War fell into the hands of Somali teenagers  
high off of a methamphetamine known as khet, who roamed the streets raping, extorting,  
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and pillaging ( Stevenson 1993). Human rights violations in Somalia became  
the target of worldwide humanitarian aid. In 1992, the United Nations sent aid  
to Somalia in support of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM); however the  
aid quickly became a casualty of the conflict, going to the warlords for resale instead of  
to the suffering civilian populace. In August 1992, the International Committee of the  
Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 4.5 million Somalis were, to varying degrees, going  
hungry (Stevenson 1993). To improve food distribution, the US led Unified Task Force  
(UNITAF), and took control of Mogadishu and eight other cities militarily. Initially,  
Aidid was in support of the aid, but he, as well as many other warlords and citizens alike,  
saw the foreign forces as colonizers, and demanded their withdrawal. This led Aidid to be  
seen as a threat to the humanitarian mission, and the US decided he needed to be  
captured.  
Battle of Mogadishu 
The Battle of Mogadishu opened the eyes of the world to the troubles of Somalia, yet  
from another perspective, it was the motivation for the influence of Islamic  
fundamentalism to continue to grow. As Aidid continued to pose a threat to peace efforts,  
a US led coalition devised a plan to remove him from power. In August 1993, Aidid’s  
men managed to kill four US soldiers and wound seven others in two separate attacks,  
prompting then US President Bill Clinton to authorize a task force of US Special  
Operations personnel, commonly referred to as Task Force Ranger, to move into Somalia  
with the mission of capturing or killing Aidid and other high ranking members of his  
group (Bowden 1999). In early October of that year, intelligence was received that two of  
Aidid’s top lieutenants were located in a safehouse in Mogadishu. As the Task Force  
moved into the city, men armed with rocket propelled grenades shot down US helicopters  
and destroyed military vehicles, ultimately ending in the death of 18 US service members  
(Bowden 1999).  Bodies of dead military personnel were dragged through the street in  
celebration, and these events were broadcast on US media outlets, causing outrage among  
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Americans, and the mission was deemed a failure by many. By 1995, all UN personnel  
were pulled from Somalia, and support to the nation severely shrank.  
On the other hand, Somali warlords and Islamic fundamentalists worldwide saw  
this as a victory. Bin Ladin quickly claimed that the militants who took down US forces  
during the battle were trained by al Qaeda. Bin Ladin said of the events: “We have  
learned from our brothers who fought in the jihad in Somalia of the incredible weakness  
and cowardice of the American soldier” (Geltzer 2010). Though there has been no  
concrete evidence, it could be said that their motivation may have been derived from a  
1992 fatwa issued by bin Ladin that called for Muslims to wage jihad against American  
forces stationed in the Arabian Peninsula (Roshandel 2006). Bin Ladin, whose help had  
been rejected by the Saudi government during the First Gulf War, was furious, and  
looked for a way to prove to the world that he was to be taken seriously. If Somali  
militants were truly trained at al Qaeda camps, was the battle of Mogadishu the birthplace  
of Al Shabaab as well as the beginning of the rise of Al Qaeda? Other media reports have  
stated that Bin Ladin later recanted his organization’s involvement, and different leaders  
within Al Shabaab have supported or refuted the claim; however the 2012 allegiance is 
not disputed. Regardless, defeat of the world’s most powerful military has served as  
motivation for the fight to continue. I believe that the Battle of Mogadishu, along with  
other small victories elsewhere, provided the inspiration for the jihad on the West to  
persevere, and without it, Islamic fundamentalism may not be as prominent as it is today.  
Lawlessness and Transition 
 After UN presence disappeared from Somali soil in 1995, Aidid declared himself  
president, but this did not last long, for he died of a heart attack in 1996 after suffering  
gunshot wounds during a battle with an opposing warlord. Peace talks were attempted  
to no avail, leaving Somalia without a recognized government until 2004 when the  
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was founded. The TFG sought to bring  
various warlord clan factions together. Also, the new government  
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attempted to outlaw sharia law establish a three part judicial system, and implement  
laws that supported human rights. However, the TFG remained unable even to establish a  
base in Mogadishu because of the threat of violence (Marten, 2007). 
 In opposition, various Islamist organizations united within a long-standing network of  
local Islamic or sharia courts in Mogadishu, came together under an umbrella  
organization, popularly known in the Western media as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)  
(Barnes and Hassan, 2007). The ICU was favored by many Somali citizens because they  
seemed able to bring some order, and they did not attempt to ally themselves with or  
mimic Western powers as the TFG had done. However, the strictness of sharia law as  
well as the corruption that has plagued every form of Somali order led to its reduced  
support. Al Shabaab was the military wing of the ICU, but soon lost favor of the ICU due  
to their harsh tactics used against civilians. When Ethiopian troops invaded Mogadishu in  
2006, members of Al Shabaab fought against the US backed force, yet were ousted from  
the capital city; however they were able to regroup and force Ethiopia out three years  
later (Hansen 2013).  
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Chapter IV Al Shabaab: The Organization 
Al Shabaab, which literally means “The Youth,” started out as the military force  
of the ICU, a coalition of sharia courts that sought to store peace and stability in southern  
and central Somalia. This coalition was created in reaction to the corruption and heinous  
acts conducted by the TFG and Ethiopia, such as genocide and collective punishment  
(Roque 2009). The ICU did, and Al Shabaab still does, believe in religion as a way to  
solve societal problems, which was a stark contrast to the Somali government. As  
members of Al Shabaab became more discontented with the passiveness of the ICU, they  
continued to enforce sharia law by way of fear and terror (Hansen 2013). As Western  
influence returned to Somalia, Al Shabaab grew, expanding their ranks to young and old,  
foreign and domestic. Part of their appeal was their ability to always take clan  
sensitivities into consideration, and although its strict interpretation of Islam and notions  
of justice are questioned by sections of Somali society, many believed that it led to the  
reduction of crime and corruption (Kisiangani 2011). 
 The mid 2000s was an integral time for the growth of Al Shabaab. In 2006, the  
small and unorganized group was easily defeated by the occupying Ethiopian forces, and  
from another perspective, they lost credibility with their countrymen due to their  
assassinations of government officials and aid workers (Marchal 2011). However, they  
remained dedicated to their cause of eradicating their nation of invaders, and regrouped to  
beat Somalia in 2007. This is important to mention because it shows the ability of Al  
Shabaab to withstand setbacks. It also defines a common theme in the power struggle in  
Somalia, which is violence. Throughout the nation’s history, death and destruction has  
been the reason for political change. Al Shabaab has been able to use fear of death as a  
tool to establish some form of dominance and respect among Somalia’s citizens, yet these  
same tactics have also led to waning support and outside intervention. This will be  
discussed later in more detail, but it is essential to address when looking at the origins of  
Al Shabaab.  
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The allegiance to Al Qaeda in February 2012 brought them onto the international  
scene; however this allegiance is not shared by all of its members. Senior officials have  
committed themselves to a global agenda, such as expanding their attacks outside of  
Somalia and even the African continent, but lower ranking fighters adhere to a local  
agenda based on clan loyalty and nationalism (Yamamoto 2012). In the past two years,  
Al Shabaab has grown exponentially and has become recognized as a threat to national  
and global security, conducting attacks in their homeland, as well as neighboring nations  
such as Kenya and Ethiopia. Though the world is slowly recognizing the dangers of this  
group, and some assistance has been directed towards the war torn country, the  
seriousness of this threat has not received the reactions on the level as conflicts in  
Afghanistan and Iraq. If the world continues to ignore Somalia and its potential to be the  
next phase of the Global War on Terrorism, Al Shabaab will continue to terrorize citizens  
of the Horn of Africa and neighboring countries, possibly even expanding outside of the  
African continent.  
This next section will examine Al Shabaab and its growth, as well as the potential  
of its downfall. Each piece will center on the aforementioned theoretical  
perspectives interchangeably. It is important to note that all of these proposed actions  
happen concurrently, and at any time, the power dynamic and level of collective action  
could shift.  Information presented comes from a combination of scholarly books and  
articles, and world news sources that have provided the most up to date information on  
the actions of Al Shabaab.    
 It is important to examine the factors of collective action that led to the creation  
of Al Shabaab. This group has the potential to become a powerhouse within the realm  
of terrorism, and could even attain legitimacy based on particular actions  First I want to  
discuss the power that has allowed them to become a formidable opponent, which is  
Islam. In a nation torn by war and poverty, religion was the one pillar that provided  
support. Ultimately, the commandments of Islam established social control and solidarity  
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when the government could not.  
Soon a new and more militant form of Islam served as a tool for Somalis to come  
together. These radical ideologies came from two fronts. The first was as the hands of a  
government that limited religious influence in politics. During Barre’s regime, the  
political system was hostile to assertions of an Islamic agenda, because he felt it had no  
place in government (De Wall 2004).The second front has been in play for centuries, but  
the potential of fundamentalist Islam had not manifested until the second half of the 20th  
century.  As mentioned before, the geographical location of Somalia served an important  
role in the introduction of Islam to Somalia, but also in the creation of Al Shabaab.  
Trading along the coast exposed Somali merchants to those from the Middle East who  
practiced Wahhabi Islam, a more militant form also commonly known as Salafi. The  
followers of the Wahaabi/Salafi sect seek to purge Islam of Western influence and  
improper legal interventions by returning to the religious instruction of the first  
generation of Muslims, the Salaf (McCants 2011). In order to gain favor with the foreign  
merchants and build a stronger trade relationship with other Islamic nations, Somalis  
began to adopt some of these practices, and subsequently introduced them into their  
homeland (Ahmed 2007).  
 As instability raged on, Somalis steadily grew weary and untrusting of their  
political system, but Islam remained steadfast. In times of danger, the safest place was  
often the mosque, and when government and clan leaders failed them, citizens found  
guidance from imams and other religious figures who preached a mixture of religion  
and Somali nationalism. Due to Somalia being predominantly Sunni Muslims, sectarian  
division was not an issue. Also, a new type of guidance emerged for Al Shabaab, combat  
veterans of foreign wars fighting in the name of Islam.  Many of these warriors were not  
Somali, but from East African and Yemeni members of Al Qaeda, who sought refuge in  
the coastal nation, and subsequently provided training and experience, which would  
prove to be essential (Hansen 2013).  
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Recruitment 
 Recruitment was fairly easy because unemployed Somali youth had very few  
options in life, so an organization that emphasized Somali nationalism and self-dignity  
seemed like a perfect solution to their problems. Plus, joining Al Shabaab was often seen  
as their only means of survival, given no other sources to provide for themselves 
 (Grover 2013). From another perspective, fear was often used as a recruitment tool.  
Members of the group would enter homes, forcing parents to give up their children, and if  
there was resistance, they were killed. Another tactic has been to enter into schools and  
force young boys to join, while forcing young women to become sex slaves or brides to  
the members (Grover 2013). 
  As mentioned previously, clanship played an important role in Somali society.  
However, in relation to Al Shabaab, clan was not as essential, and though many of them  
fought against each other in past clan skirmishes, they were able to put that behind  
them and focus on the outside enemy, such as the Somali transitional government and  
Ethiopia.  Leaders were drawn from all clans, and unlike their Middle Eastern Al Qaeda  
counterparts, they did not allow foreigners to take on leadership roles  
(Hansen 2013). This is very unique because it did not follow the path of such groups like  
the Taliban and Al Qaeda. In spite of the training received by outsiders, they refused to  
let them completely run the group, which initially kept Al Shabaab as a nationalist  
movement. All this would change, but that will be discussed in more detail later.  
 Though foreign influence was initially limited, there was one faction that  
supported Al Shabaab in their initial stages that played an integral role in the weakening  
the Somali government. As mentioned during my definition of terrorism, states  
recognized by international bodies often participate in or support terrorist activities. In  
relation to Al Shabaab, this state is Eritrea. This relationship is rather exceptional  
considering that jihadists often conducted attacks in the more secular nation, and the fact  
that Eritrea condemned the mere notion of Al Shabaab. However, they had a common  
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enemy, Ethiopia. Al Shabaab’s Faruq Unit often conducted attacks in Ethiopia, and were  
heavily supported by the Eritrean government under the notion that our enemy’s enemy is  
our friend (Hansen 2013). This situation is very important because it establishes how  
fundamentalist terrorism can easily cross over into state terrorism, and how blurry the  
line can be when trying to determine the difference between the two.  
Logistical and Financial Support 
Logistical and financial support grew steadily as the group expanded. Initially,  
weapons and money came from TFG defectors, and from the Eritrean government, even  
though the nation has denied these transactions (Kisiangani 2011).Locally, Al-Shabaab 
is supported by community-based support structures, receiving assistance from mosques,  
religious leaders and community networks. (Kisiangani 2011). Furthermore, when Al  
Shabaab gained control of the port of Kismayo, it was reported that they made a deal with  
Somali pirates that the group would receive 20% of profits from hijacking 
 (Childress 2010). Other Muslim nations such as Yemen, Syria, Iran, and Qatar, have  
long been believed to be a source of weapons and money for Al Shabaab (Joselow 2010).  
Another important source of funding has come from the Somali diaspora, which has been  
estimated to sending 500-800 million dollars to Al Shabaab a year (Menkhaus 2009).  
Such a support system has allowed the group to continue to grow, and if such support  
continues, they could easily support terrorist acts on a much larger scale. 
Collective Action in Tactics 
 Though outnumbered significantly, Al Shabaab was able to weaken those that  
opposed them, including the Somali government and the Ethiopian military. AS formed  
squads of 8-10 men that initially conducted small arms offensive attacks on civil  
servants, activists, businessmen, and the Ethiopian backed Somali military.  
Soon, possibly due to foreign influence, they shifted to suicide attacks and the use of  
remote controlled devices (Hansen 2013). One interesting tactic that has been used is  
the occupancy of military outposts or unoccupied cities for short periods of time and  
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subsequent evacuation. I believe this was done for two possible reasons. The first is that  
Al Shabaab wanted to scare their opposition and lower their morale, ultimately leading to  
defection and even the refusal of Somali troops to occupy these posts, creating a path  
for Al Shabaab to establish a regional stronghold. On the other hand, this could expose a  
training and logistics flaw. After a post was taken, it is possible that they were not  
trained to establish defensive positions. Also, they may not have planned reinforcement  
rotations, or resupply to allow them to maintain the post. Regardless of potential  
problems, this unique tactic worked, and played a key role in forcing Ethiopian troops to  
withdraw in 2009.  
Media 
Al Shabaab turned to the media to express their desires, to educate others, and  
to recruit potential members. The group exploited the citizens’ love of the internet to  
further their cause, creating websites full of pictures and poetry. Though the  
government regulated the internet, and often shut these sites down, Al Shabaab instantly  
created others. In 2011, the group seized a Mogadishu television station and created Al- 
Kitaib, an AS station that featured propaganda and other footage that displayed their  
strength (Harper 2102). It can also be assumed that Al Shabaab used radio stations as  
well, because one of their tactics to appeal to younger members was modern, Western  
style music such as rap. (Wright 2011).  
Most of their media representation focused on two important aspects: religion and  
strength. These media outlets showed footage of pious Muslims from one angle and from  
the other, militants with faces covered and draped by weaponry, as well as those who  
were the enemies of Al Shabaab, who most likely met their death at their hands. These  
uses of various types of media have greatly benefited recruitment and the spread of  
ideology, especially amongst easily influenced youths that serve as the backbone of the  
organization (Marchal 2011).  
The display of the duality of Islamic militancy was beneficial to the cause of Al  
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Shabaab, yet could have hurt them as well. As these outlets began to grow in popularity  
and reach, they began to feature fighters from other parts of the world, especially in  
Arab nations. Biographies of the leaders of Al Qaeda, such as Bin Ladin and Ayman al- 
Zawahiri were introduced to Somalia, with captions in Arabic, though later in Somali  
(Marchal 2011). The embracing of the battles of others may not have sat well with those  
who supported Al Shabaab as a nationalist organization. Though some power can be  
derived from the victories of others in the name of Islam, this could lead to mental  
defection among supporters who have little concern about that which exists outside of  
Somalia. It could also reignite memories of the forceful inundation of non-Somali  
ideologies, such as Western style authoritarianism by President Barre. There has been no  
proof of this happening as of yet, but in an organization that was once very local, yet now  
has international reach, this could be very possible.  
 The media also exposed Somalis to extreme violence at the hands of Al Shabaab.   
One example is the introduction to an element of culture that was not native to the  
nation, the martyrdom of those who died violently in the name of Islam. Though many  
Somalis died in civil wars and during battles with Ethiopia, they were not quickly hailed  
as heroes for a good cause, and with all the death still continuing, whether it be from  
war of hardships such as famine and disease, it may not have been something many  
were so quick to relive. Also, using the media to increase awareness could lead many to  
fear for their lives, especially if they do not support Al Shabaab wholeheartedly. Displays  
of kidnappings and senseless killings may show the power of the organization, but could  
also leave Somali citizens wondering about the true nature of the group, especially if  
they have seen little proof of any acts of goodwill. Once again, there is no proof of this,  
but I believe that Somali citizens have experienced so much death and destruction, and  
they don’t want to continue on that path.  
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Foreign Influence 
 As stated earlier, foreign influence played a large role in making Al Shabaab what  
it is today. Many of the original group moved into Somalia after being wanted for  
offenses in their native countries, but this group soon expanded to arms dealers and  
war torn veterans of the Afghan-Russian war (Hansen 2013). Many of them, believed to  
be Al Qaida, have been seen as partially responsible for the Black Hawk Down incident  
in 1993. Though recognized as a potential problem to international security, no  
collaborative efforts were taken other than the United States supporting Ethiopia’s  
invasion into Somalia in 2006. Recently the world has started to pay attention due to  
residents of Western nations leaving their homes to support the jihad in Somalia. Some  
of these residents are Somali refugees returning to the land they fled to avoid civil war.  
The FBI led “Operation Rhino” has recently exposed a connection to the group in  
Minneapolis, where Somali immigrant men have been recruited, and returned to  
Somalia to fight. Both US officials and Al Shabaab leaders have confirmed this,  
estimating that approximately 40 Americans are now in Somalia fighting, with the  
promise of paradise if they die in combat against the invaders 
 ( Ferran, Hughes, Kanani, and Ryan 2012). This comes as no surprise, for large Muslim  
communities have often been recruiting ground for groups like Al Qaeda and its  
affiliated movements such as Al Shabaab. Regardless, this could be a major problem for  
the Western world, because it may increase the possibility of an international terrorist  
attack on their turf. An example of this possibility is the July 2005 London subway attack  
that killed 26 people (Pflanz 2012).  
However, what has been a slight surprise is that white Americans and  
Europeans are joining the fight. There have been isolated cases where a Westerner has  
joined the jihad, such as John Walker Lindh, who was captured fighting alongside the  
Taliban when US led coalition forces invaded Afghanistan, but situations as these send 
shockwaves throughout the global community (ASIL 2002). Two examples are Omar  
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Hammami from the United States and the British born Samantha Lewthwaite. Both were  
white and have provided support to Al Qaeda related movements in the past.  
Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansour al Amriki, was born in Daphne  
Alabama 1984 to a white Christian mother and Muslim father of Syrian origin 
 (Mastors, Siers 2014).Though he attended a Southern Baptist church with his mother, he  
began to lean towards Islam in the seventh grade after his father introduced him to his  
Syrian roots, and he learned that members of his family were jailed for being part of the  
Muslim Brotherhood, a group that gained popularity in Egypt, yet had members  
throughout the Middle East that called for spiritual reform and resorted to violence to  
further their agenda (Teitelbaum 2011)  Hammami later moved to a Somali  
community in Toronto Canada, where he fell in love with Somali culture in Toronto.  
Inspired by the war in Iraq, Hammami traveled to Egypt in 2006 and later moved into  
Somalia to become a part of Al Shabaab (Hansen 2013). As a member of AL Shabaab, he  
became well known due to his use of social media to display his viewpoints and because  
of his lyrical rap skills, which made him popular among the youth in Somalia 
(Mastors, Siers 2014). The FBI placed a 5 million dollar reward for Hammami, but it was  
not Americans who killed him. In September 2013, he was killed by fellow Al Shabaab  
members. Many believed this was due to his criticism of the extravagant life led by the  
leaders of the group (Brown, Straw 2013). 
Samantha Lewthwaite, aka the “White Widow,” gained the world’s attention  
when her husband, Germaine Lindsay, who was one of four bombers, conducted an 
attack on a London subway that killed 26 people, as well as the bombers. Though she  
professed complete “incomprehension” at his “horrific” act, she disappeared weeks  
later with her two children by Lindsey (Pflanz 2012). It was believed that she fled to  
Kenya, where she joined Al Shabaab, possibly planning small attacks, and even taking a  
leadership role. It was initially thought that she was one of the terrorists that were killed  
in the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya, an attack claimed by Al Shabaab that left  
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62 civilians dead (Karimi 2013). Forensics proved otherwise, and recently reports have  
surfaced that she is now married to a senior Al Qaeda member. Though her whereabouts  
are unknown, it is believed that she is hiding in Kenya or Somalia, and is currently  
wanted by British and Kenyan officials (Karimi 2013).  
The Western world has become more alert due to the movement of its residents  
into extremist organizations outside of their homelands. From the perspective of Al  
Shabaab’s collective action, this could be positive. Mere recognition has the potential  
to elevate their struggle to a position that will attract many fighters who share their  
sentiments. This exposure also shows that they are being taken seriously, and they  
could amass power just by reputation and perceived threat. The introduction of  
foreigners creates a network of worldwide allies who can provide financial and logistical  
support, which is essential for Al Shabaab’s survival. It also creates a worldwide fear,  
which in many ways is more powerful and detrimental than physical attacks.  
From an opposite perspective, foreign influence and Western recognition could  
be detrimental to Al Shabaab. As mentioned before, the organization originally kept  
non-Somalis from holding positions of authority. However, even if they remain steadfast  
on this rule, the mere presence of white skin amongst dark faces will cause a shift of  
focus to understand why foreigners are joining a fight that is not theirs. But this does not  
appear to be very common When the Westgate attacks occurred, the media went into  
frenzy after receiving word that a foreigner was possibly involved, therefore slightly  
downplaying the significance of the attack and taking the lens off of Al Shabaab. 
 While I was deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, a report of any foreign fighters in  
the area was a top priority, because they were known to put up a more fierce fight than  
the native terrorists, and it was our goal to discover their methods for crossing the borders  
to join the fight. The fight was not in their homeland, but they were ready to leave home  
to fight the invaders from the West. It may not have been their fight, but it was the fight  
of their kinsmen, bound together by religion and an extreme disdain of the West. From  
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another angle, I witnessed how outside influence often led to dissidence amongst Al  
Qaeda in Iraq specifically. The leader of this faction has never been an Iraqi, and  
oftentimes I would talk to detainees about their confusion as to why a foreigner was in  
charge as opposed to a local fighter. The reason I bring this up is because it provides a  
frame as to why I previously mentioned how foreign influence could make or break Al  
Shabaab. 
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Chapter V The Future of Al Shabaab 
Though the future prowess of Al Shabaab is uncertain, they appear to have some  
longevity, but whether or not they will ever gain legitimacy in the eyes of Somali citizens  
and the world is unknown. Currently the group is conducting attacks in both Kenya and  
Somalia as a show of force, with targets ranging from government buildings to tourist  
spots. This is obviously a scare tactic, though some dispute if they are actually  
responsible. Recently, Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for attacks along the Kenyan  
coast that left 29 dead, but Kenyan officials publicly declared that their investigations  
showed otherwise, and that local dissident groups were responsible  (Akwiri 2014). In  
February 2014, Al Shabaab militants attacked the Somali presidential palace, killing two  
government officials, but the fighters were killed by guards before doing any more  
damage. In July 2014, they tried again and though they managed to penetrate the  
building’s walls by bombing one entrance and storming in, when they detonated the  
suicide vests they were wearing, they killed only themselves. Subsequently, a  
spokesperson for the group announced that Al Shabaab had taken over the palace, but  
this proved to be false (Nor, Capeluoto 2014) . 
The aforementioned attacks appear to be acts of desperation in an effort to  
strike fear and demonstrate their power. Small scale attacks once worked for Al  
Shabaab, but with the federal government that took power in 2012 after the election of  
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, they have had trouble gaining strongholds due to  
the legitimacy of the new Somali government, something that did not exist for decades.  
With this legitimacy comes the return of embassies from countries such as the United  
States, Great Britain, Turkey, and China (Reuters 2014). From one angle, this may give  
Al Shabaab more targets, but it is unlikely that they will suppress the power of these  
nations.  
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Hope in Somalia and Indicators of a Weakened Al Shabaab 
 There is no doubt that the mention of Al Shabaab continues to strike fear in the  
hearts of Somalia’s citizens, but there have been incidents that show that the new  
government is taking steps to reclaim power and lessen that possessed by Al Shabaab.  
In 2012, the US State Department offered $33 million through its Rewards for Justice  
program to help suppress the group, which includes a $7 million bounty for its leader,  
Ahmed Abdi Godane. Also, Ethiopian, Kenyan, and African Union troops are working  
with the Somali government to collect intelligence and conduct attacks on Al Shabaab  
strongholds. (Ibrahim 2012). So far this has been successful, because Al Shabaab has  
been forced into a much smaller territory, therefore their ability to expand has been  
severely crippled. A testament to this success occurred 01 September 2014, when  
Godane was killed by a US airstrike. Though suffering a debilitating loss, the group  
quickly named a new leader, Ahmed Umar, also known as Abu Ubaidah 
 (Mohamed 2014). Little is known about him, but it is apparent that he plans on avenging  
their comrade’s death by continuing attacks throughout Somalia.  
From a human rights perspective, it is definitely positive that Somalia has  
accepted help from other nations. However, this can lead to further chaos. As seen in the  
past, outside intervention has led to the mistrust of the Somali government, which could  
ultimately be at risk for neocolonialism and returned imperialism. Also, many citizens  
remember the United States’ failed attempt at instilling order during the First Battle of  
Mogadishu, as well as Ethiopia’s attempt to invade. Both instances could lead to mistrust  
of the foreigners, and this could actually end up supporting Al Shabaab’s ideology of  
preventing foreign influence. 
What about the Children? 
 As mentioned before, Al Shabaab notoriously used children soldiers to carry out  
their destructive plans, keeping them from school and taking them away from their  
families, already weakened by poverty and fear. The opportunity for a formal education  
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was slim, especially for young boys, who had to take to the street to earn money to  
support their families. Regardless of this sad reality, there is new hope. Somalia has  
created a program called Go2School that will provide free education to over 1 million  
children. (Guled 2014). This free education will lessen the need to work odd jobs on the  
streets that puts these young souls at risk, and reduces the ability of Al Shabaab to recruit  
them with the promise of a better life.  
However, this could actually make certain schools and students a target of those  
who disagree with this program and its teachings. Al Shabaab leaders have publicly 
 stated that these schools are legitimate targets due to their secularized intentions  
(Guled 2014). Such tactics were used by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and unfortunately  
their actions kept children from going to school, and those who taught at these  
institutions were frequently assassinated. Somalia currently has one of the worst  
literacy rates in the world, and it is unfortunate that learning how to read and write can  
be a death sentence. Still, there are those who persevere to educate their fellow  
citizens, and this will be the key to overcoming oppression.  
Women of Somalia 
 Even though the women of Somalia are not responsible for the fighting, they  
constantly suffer at the hands of an altered form of Islam imposed by men who see them  
as inferior. They are restricted in every aspect of their lives, including form of dress, and  
ability to live without the fear of sexual assault or persecution. Recently, Somali women  
have been fighting to have a voice in their nation, and slowly, they are seeing some  
change. One major change is the ability of women to attend competitive  
soccer games and sit where they please. These matches, which had not occurred since  
1991, were controlled by Islamic fundamentalists who banned the mixing of sexes, so  
women were not allowed to even attend (Nor 2013). Now these women can attend  
such events, sit next to the opposite sex, and not lock themselves in their homes out of  
fear. This may seem like a rather infinitesimal step towards progress, but the fact that  
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these women are able to experience some type of freedom free of gender  
discrimination is truly uplifting. Hopefully such progress will continue, and gender  
equality will be achieved.  
 The discussion of women and children serves the purpose of showing that there  
have been steps taken to provide them with basic human rights. Doing so will reduce the  
influence of Al Shabaab’s doctrine, also giving Somali citizens hope that their  
government is supporting them, something that was not seen for so long. Even though the  
attacks may continue, the actions of Somali leadership that reflect their desire to help  
their people will slowly lead to an increased legitimacy of the government, while slowly  
chipping away at the validity of Al Shabaab’s existence.  
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Chapter VI Conclusion 
Revisiting Theory 
 When I began my research on Al Shabaab, I had trouble finding a theory that fit  
the rise and potential fall of the group. However, the combination of power and  
collective action allowed me to thoroughly analyze trends of successes and failures. I  
have found that my proposed theories were accurate, yet some parts of them were  
weaker when trying to explain the rise of Al Shabaab. For example, the initial collective  
action strengthened the group without the presence of a stable government, but once  
one was established, this same collective action did not evolve, and it could serve  
detrimental to the legitimacy of these jihadists as they continue their fight. Also, I  
realized that it was not the reduction of collective action of opposing forces that gave  
power to Al Shabaab, but the complete lack of collective action of the transitional  
government that gave then their opportunity to expand their influence .If there was any  
governmental unity, Al Shabaab would not have grown as it did, nor would they  
be a threat to international security today.  
Types and Levels of Power 
 Throughout my research, I discovered how the various types and levels of power  
appeared throughout the rise of Al Shabaab. However, I began to formulate the idea  
that each type or level was more of a goal , and each was equally important from the  
perspectives of Al Shabaab and those who opposed them. Also, I noticed that at times,  
each type or level of power could have occurred simultaneously. . My findings regarding  
Gaventa’s (2006) types of power follow.  
Power Over: Al Shabaab obtained power over various regions through small attacks and  
fear tactics. These actions rendered local citizens, as well as government officials  
powerless, and as Al Shabaab’s power grew, they were able to continue these activities.  
This power over was initially achieved at a local level, but grew to a national level of  
power as they continued to expand and dominate.  
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Power To/Power Within:  I grouped these two together, because they are very similar,  
and they seem to work in the same capacity. Al Shabaab derived their motivation from a  
long nationalistic history as well as from Islam, both which that fueled their desire to take  
back their country from a corrupt government, and to prevent unneeded outside influence,  
especially from the West. By trying to implement sharia law and resisting Western  
culture and teachings, Al Shabaab was able to maintain power that was based on  
isolationism, therefore establishing power at the national level. 
Power With: This initially occurred at the local level, for Al Shabaab was able to surpass  
tribal affiliations to unify into the organization it became. From these alliances, their  
power became national, especially after they obtained some form of governmental  
legitimacy. Even after they became too radical for the transitional government, they  
were able to maintain that power by showing that they had the skill and prowess to  
prevent Ethiopia’s invasion. Al Shabaab’s power began to become international even  
before the unrest in the 1990’s began. Many of its leaders fought the jihad in  
Afghanistan, therefore establishing connections that would benefit them. Also, Al Qaeda  
members used Somalia for refuge, therefore continuing that potential of international  
power. As mentioned before, Al Shabaab gained an ally in Eritrea, a nation who  
benefited from the group because they shared an enemy in Ethiopia. Lastly, Al Shabaab  
declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda, therefore elevating them to an international  
organization. The financial backing from such a large and powerful group allowed  
recruitment outside of Somalia, which furthered their ideological reach, truly giving  
them international implications.  
Legitimacy: Al Shabaab has experienced various ups and downs of their legitimacy.  
Once seen as a force that would protect Somalia from a corrupt government and outside  
influence, their violence against those that once supported them, as well as their own  
members, has cause their validity to dissipate. Also, their premeditated attacks such as the  
one at the Westgate Mall, which killed over a hundred innocent people has shown Somali  
37 
 
citizens, as well as the rest of the world, that they are ruthless, and that they are not  
conducting these acts in the name of Allah, but as a show of force with no true reason.  
Final Thoughts 
Al Shabaab grew out of the confusion and turmoil that plagued Somalia, and the  
ideologies originally adopted, such as transcending clanship and the focus on Islam were  
the forces that provided them with their initial validity. As the transitional government  
failed to provide any hope for Somali citizens, Al Shabaab picked up the slack and  
exemplified strength through nationalism. This was only temporary, for the same  
corruption that inundated the government made its way into the organization’s ranks, and  
those in power became more concerned with their own agendas as opposed to the plight  
of their people, who were often their targets if they did not live up to the radicalized  
standard of Islam adopted by Al Shabaab. I believe this will lead to their demise,  
regardless of their allegiance to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda related movements have begun to  
regroup and take territories in places like Iraq and Mali, so it can be assumed that any  
support will go to establishing regional strongholds, and with the introduction of foreign  
diplomacy back to Somalia, this will be difficult for Al Shabaab to do in their nation of  
origin.  
Though I think that Al Shabaab will never reclaim the glory they possessed in the  
late 2000s, I do believe that they will remain a threat to Somalia and neighboring  
countries, but will not reach international levels. A comparison that comes to mind is  
that Al Shabaab is like a child bully that wants to show off to everyone. They conduct  
attacks to kill and maim, but they do not seem to have a focus anymore, and soon their  
followers will lose faith in the organization because there appears to be no goal other  
than to destroy. 
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